Testifying in Singapore

by Derek Aldridge

This article first appeared in the Summer 2009 issue of the Expert Witness.

At the end of February of this year, I testified in a personal injury case in Singapore. I thought our readers would be interested in hearing about my experience.

One of the aspects of the case that made it especially interesting – and challenging – from my point of view is that there are no case-law precedents for the use of economic experts in personal-injury cases in Singapore. In order to accept my evidence, the court would potentially be opening the door to the use of economists or similar experts in future cases. While it is not completely clear to me why there is no history of using economists in Singapore, it appears that the cost of hiring experts is a significant barrier to plaintiffs there. I was advised that for personal injury claims in Singapore, plaintiff lawyers are not allowed to charge any fees until the case is settled. Their ultimate fee is decided by the court and based on what the lawyers submit and the complexity of the case. The lawyers are not allowed to negotiate a contingency fee arrangement. Clearly this imposes a substantial financial barrier for most plaintiffs, since few would have the resources to fund a complex personal injury case in which experts are needed. For the case I worked on, I was hired by the plaintiff side, and the plaintiff did indeed have the financial resources needed to fund the case.

While I will not reveal too many details of the case here, it is sufficient to know that the plaintiff was a young man who was injured at the beginning of a career which would eventually yield a high income. In addition, his father was well-established in the same career, and the son would possibly eventually join in his father’s business. The plaintiff was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, but was able to resume his career, albeit with a short delay (less than a year) and with ongoing residual deficits. Due to the nature of his career, if his residual deficits impair his on-the-job productivity, then his income will also be reduced. However, due to the stage he is at in his career, his reduced capacity has not had an appreciable impact on earnings so far. Because of the age of the plaintiff, and his high potential future income without- and with-accident, even a modest ongoing reduction in his annual income would yield a large present value of his future loss.

Liability was already established. The defendant argued that the residual deficits would not impair the plaintiff’s ability to do his job, and his loss was limited to the period of the delay, immediately following the accident. If the plaintiff-side was correct, the loss could be millions, while if the defendant was correct, the loss would be negligible. The case hinged on the medical/vocational evidence (concerning the impact of the plaintiff’s injuries on his job performance) and the economic evidence (concerning the impact of reduced on-the-job performance on his earning capacity).

While personal injury litigation in Singapore has much in common with that that in Canada, one notable difference is that expert witnesses are not used to provide evidence concerning a plaintiff’s loss of income. Instead, the courts rely on tables of multipliers to determine a person’s total loss, given findings concerning the annual loss. This approach can be satisfactory in many cases, but often not in cases when a plaintiff’s income path is expected to experience substantial growth, and/or when a plaintiff’s career paths has been delayed as a result of an injury, and/or when an injury will cause earlier retirement. In the case for which I testified, all of these were factors.

My colleague Laura Weir and I prepared a report for the plaintiff. We never received any written rebuttal responses from the defendant. Arrangements were made for me to travel to Singapore to testify at the end of February, though I expected the case would settle beforehand. It did not, and I made the long journey to Singapore.

I was called to give evidence on a Friday morning. There was no direct examination by the plaintiff’s lawyer – my report was to stand alone as my direct evidence. All questions concerning my evidence were asked by the defence lawyer and the judge. In my case there was no opposing expert evidence, though I presumed that the defence lawyers would be well-briefed by someone who could identify the most important weaknesses in my report. While the defendant was reluctant to have me offer evidence at all, the judge decided that he would hear my evidence and later decide whether or not to use it.

There were several things that were unusual concerning my courtroom experience, compared to my experience with the courts in Alberta. First, the plaintiff was not allowed to be in the courtroom to hear the evidence that I gave. While I testified, the only occupants of the courtroom were myself, two lawyers for the plaintiff, two for the defendant, and the judge. And it was the judge himself who maintained the written “transcript” of the proceedings. He typed at his computer, recording a nearly verbatim version of what was said by all of us, and his transcript was displayed in front of each of us on computer monitors. I found this to be helpful, because it provided me with a written version of all questions posed to me, and also enabled me to read back my own responses which helped in deciding whether or not I was satisfied with my response.

Another unusual part of my courtroom experience was the number of questions the judge asked. I think he asked nearly as many questions as the defence lawyer. Some of his questions seemed to be attempts to clarify my evidence, but others were more probing, consistent with what one would expect from opposing counsel. Apparently the extent of his questioning was not typical of the Singapore Courts.

The judge and defence lawyer were also interested in the calculations that were the basis of my evidence. I was advised the day before I testified that the court would ask me to describe my calculations in detail and provide electronic copies. At the end of my first day of testimony I took the court through my calculations. For me, this was probably the most interesting part of my testimony, and being a computer enthusiast, I was in my comfort zone. I sat beside the judge, and using his mouse and keyboard, we went through the calculations together, with the screen output directed to monitors that also appeared in front of plaintiff counsel and defence.

Fortunately, the judge was quite technically oriented and easily followed along with all of my Excel calculations. And also fortunately (for me), the defence lawyer seemed to be less technically inclined and asked few questions. At the end of my first day of testimony (8:00 pm on a Friday!) we distributed electronic copies of the calculations to the lawyers for their review that evening. The next morning (yes, Saturday), we were back in court and no one had any significant questions regarding the calculations.

The second day’s testimony was much shorter than the first – only about four hours with two short breaks – and things continued to go smoothly for me. In total, I testified for about 11 hours, which is far longer than any of my previous efforts.

I returned to Canada and nervously awaited to see if I would be part of a landmark Singapore judgment. Unfortunately, no. After 16 days of hearing (12 days after my evidence), the case settled out of court, shortly before the plaintiff was about to testify. Based on the amount of the settlement, I believe it was a very favourable result for the plaintiff and suggests to me that the defendant believed there was a high probability that my evidence would have been largely accepted. It is possible that the defendant insurers settled in order to avoid the risk that my economic evidence would have been accepted, creating a precedent for allowing similar evidence in future cases.

leaf

Derek Aldridge is a consultant with Economica and has a Master of Arts degree (in economics) from the University of Victoria.

Examination of Expert Witnesses

by Christopher Bruce and Derek Aldridge

This article first appeared in the winter 2008 issue of the Expert Witness.

On October 28 in Edmonton and October 29 in Calgary, Chris Bruce and Derek Aldridge were participants in a Legal Education Society of Alberta panel on examination of expert witnesses. In this note, we offer some recommendations regarding the examination of expert economists. These recommendations are based on our comments during the panel, and the feedback we received.

We divide our advice into pre-testimony and during-testimony periods.

Pre-Testimony

An effective examination is not created days, weeks, or even months before trial, but years. That is because an effective examination begins with a well-constructed expert’s report. In our experience, at least half of the judge’s impression of your expert’s opinion is going to be based on his or her reading of that expert’s report. Our advice, therefore, is that as soon as you receive the first report from your expert, you should try to read it from the perspective of the judge. If you cannot follow the report easily, despite having been immersed in the case, it is not likely that the judge will be able to follow it either.

This is not to say that you should attempt to influence what your expert is going to say. You do, however, have the right to ask your expert to improve how that opinion has been expressed. At this stage, you should particularly be looking for a clear, logical, methodical development of the expert’s argument. Are the facts and assumptions, upon which the opinion has been based, stated clearly? Is there a clear progression from the facts and assumptions to the conclusions? Does the expert employ clear, simple terminology and arguments? Does he or she “tell the reader what he/she is going to say, say it, then tell the reader what has been said?” Too often, we are sent opposing experts’ reports with a request that we please explain what that expert has said. If the lawyer we are working for cannot understand the opposing expert’s report, it is unlikely that the lawyer for whom the report was prepared could understand it either ? and it is also highly unlikely that the judge will understand it.

Be cautious when asking your economist to present scenarios that may not be supportable. For example, suppose your plaintiff had a well-established career and earned a steady income averaging $75,000 per year. Your economist will likely include a scenario in which it is assumed that the $75,000 annual income would have continued, but for the accident. However, your plaintiff might have advised you that earnings of $100,000 would have been available, due to a likely promotion, and you may decide to ask your economist to include such a scenario, with the understanding that supporting evidence (say, from the employer) will be forthcoming. If it turns out that no evidence will be offered in court to support the more-optimistic scenario, it will reflect badly on your expert (and your case) if the judge is unimpressed with scenarios that are presented as “illustrative only” or “at the request of counsel.”

We strongly recommend that you have a meeting with your expert some time in the two or three weeks preceding a trial: to clarify what the expert’s opinion is in detail and to prepare the most effective method of presenting that opinion in court. We feel that there are at least four major advantages to this pre-trial meeting. (i) As most experts are involved in hundreds of actions and may have written the report in this case months, if not years, ago, a pre-trial meeting can ensure that the expert is fully familiar with his/her own report. (ii) As it is common that new information becomes available in the last month or two before the trial, it is important that the expert is made aware of this information. (iii) You and the expert should discuss the most effective techniques for presenting his/her evidence. Are you, for example, going to follow the expert’s report page-by-page? At this stage, it is often useful to try some practice questions on the expert as experts can sometimes find the wording of questions to be confusing. If there are certain points that you especially want your expert to make during his/her testimony, make sure that your expert knows this, and knows what type of question you will ask in order to obtain the desired response. (iv) A review of the file with your expert may provide you with a clearer assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of both your expert’s report and that of the opposing experts, thereby creating a firmer basis on which to negotiate a settlement.

It is often also important to meet with your expert during the trial, a day or two before his/her testimony. As the lay witnesses appear before the experts, it is important that your expert be informed about any new information that has been presented during the lay testimony. Also, since the economist typically follows most (if not all) of the other experts, your economist can be advised of what evidence was ultimately offered by some of the other experts who prepared reports that were used as a foundation for the economist’s evidence. For example, if the vocational expert’s evidence has changed slightly from that offered in his 218 report (based on new information offered by lay witnesses during trial perhaps), it is important for your economist to know about this. Finally, the expert can be informed concerning the general approach that has been taken by both the opposing counsel and by the judge.

In the weeks or days before testimony, it is important to discuss with your expert the counter-arguments that you and he/she expect will be raised by the other side. While rebuttal reports may been prepared already, it is useful to try to identify what will be the most contentious economic issues, and what your expert’s response will be. Discuss any weaknesses in your expert’s report, and how they might be dealt with in court.

During-Testimony

Unless you have a particularly poorly-qualified expert, you should always begin the expert’s testimony by reviewing his/her qualifications, to impress the judge with the expertise of your witness. If you have a particularly well-qualified expert, opposing counsel may attempt to preclude you from introducing these qualifications by announcing that he/she will accept the expert’s qualifications without a review of the c.v. It is not advisable, of course, to succumb to this tactic.

Before beginning a review of the expert’s qualifications, it is advisable to inform the judge what that individual’s area of expertise is, so the judge can contrast the expert’s qualifications with the expertise that you are claiming.

Do not simply ask the expert to describe his/her c.v. Some experts will be too modest to provide a full description ? and some will be too boastful. Rather, ask them a series of questions about specific aspects of their expertise ? for example, about their most important educational attainments, their professional experience, their most important publications, and their experience testifying.

Enter the expert’s report and base your examination on the report. As the judge will not have expertise in the expert’s area, it will be useful for the judge to have the report before him/her as an aid to understanding the testimony. Also, as the judge will need to read the report later, when preparing a decision, it will be useful to be able to relate the recorded testimony to the report.

Follow the report page-by-page, if not paragraph-by-paragraph or line-by-line in your questioning of the expert. Our experience is that judges find it useful to follow the report during the testimony. If you start jumping around from page to page, the judge will become frustrated.

Ask questions that require only short answers. The court’s attention is held better that way than by allowing the expert to ramble on, perhaps becoming embroiled in the language of his/her discipline.

If you are representing the plaintiff and you think opposing counsel is going to introduce his/her own expert to counter yours, it may be advisable to ask your expert to comment on the opposing expert’s arguments. Your expert may be in a better position to expose the weaknesses of those arguments than you will be in cross-examination.

Similarly, you should also attempt to anticipate the tack that opposing counsel will use in cross-examination of your witness and ask your expert to comment on the anticipated arguments. Your expert will be much more comfortable “arguing” with you than with your opponent, both because cross-examiners will often severely curtail any attempt by experts to raise counter-arguments and because most experts will be reluctant to appear argumentative (with cross-examiners) as it makes them appear biased.

Sometimes during cross-examination, your expert may concede a weakness or error in his/her report. If the other lawyer does not allow your expert ample opportunity to discuss the significance of this weakness/error, then it may be helpful for you to raise the issue during redirect. This will provide your expert with additional time to think about the issue, and to provide a more in-depth response, if one is required.

Conclusion

In summary, a successful examination of your expert economist begins with a well-written report, containing scenarios and assumptions that match the evidence that will ultimately be offered in court. Regardless of your expert’s prior trial experience, it is always useful to meet with him or her before trial to discuss the economic evidence that will be offered, prepare for the other side’s arguments, and advise him/her of relevant testimony by other witnesses. With a suitable foundation and preparation before trial, your expert will have the best opportunity to perform well during trial.

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary.

Derek Aldridge is a consultant with Economica and has a Master of Arts degree (in economics) from the University of Victoria.

The Reliability of Statistical Evidence Concerning the Impact of Disability

by Christopher Bruce

This article first appeared in the winter 2004 issue of the Expert Witness.

Expert witnesses often testify that their experience, or the latest research, leads them to believe that a plaintiff’s injuries will have certain long-term physical, educational, or employment consequences. For example, the plaintiff’s injuries are predicted to worsen, or improve, along some projected time line. Or those injuries are expected to affect the probability that the plaintiff will be able to complete a planned educational program or enter a preferred occupation. Or an opinion will be given concerning the effect that certain disabilities will have on the income that the plaintiff will be able to earn.

When listening to such testimony, I am often reminded of Benjamin Disraeli’s famous complaint that “there are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics.” Expert testimony – particularly expert testimony with respect to the application of medical statistics to the determination of damages in personal injury cases – gives rise to three alternative interpretations that might be attached to Disraeli’s adage.

First, there is the sense in which I suspect Disraeli himself meant his quote: as a complaint that laypeople – judges and lawyers in this case, politicians in his – often find the (statistical) testimony of expert witnesses to be so confusing that they have difficulty distinguishing fact from fiction. That is, his was a call for more clarity; less use of obscure, technical language.

A second version might be recast as: there are “liars, damn liars, and those who abuse statistics.” This is a complaint against those who intentionally twist the interpretation of statistics, hoping either that the opposing expert has insufficient statistical knowledge to be able to recognise the deception, or that the court will have insufficient expertise to be able to determine which of the experts is telling the truth.

Finally, the sense in which Disraeli’s dictum is of greatest relevance to legal advocacy might be restated as: there are “liars, damn liars, and those who misuse statistics.” By this I mean the situation in which “experts” have insufficient knowledge of statistical analysis to realize that they have misunderstood or misrepresented the data that they are citing. My experience suggests both that this situation occurs with depressing frequency in personal injury cases, particularly with respect to medical statistics; and that opposing counsel allow these “misused” statistics to go unchallenged far too often.

The purpose of this paper will be to assist the courts to recognise the sources of statistical “misuse” and to institute methods of responding to the errors that arise. In a second paper, to be published in the next issue of the Expert Witness, I will report a number of statistics concerning the impact of disabilities on earning capacity, taken from sources that use reliable statistical techniques.

Sources of Statistical “Misuse”

There are three reasons why statistical evidence concerning the impact of disabilities on earnings might not be reliable. First, the expert may be basing his/her conclusions on past experience treating patients similar to the plaintiff, without taking into account the statistical uncertainties inherent in such an approach. Second, the expert, due to inadequacies in his or her own statistical training, may have misinterpreted data produced by a third party. Third, the expert may not have recognised that the data he or she is using to develop a prognosis were themselves collected or reported using unreliable statistical techniques. Examples of each of these types of error are discussed in this section.

1. The Expert’s Experience May Not Be Reliable

In many cases, experts drawn from the specialties that treat plaintiffs’ injuries – doctors, psychologists, physiotherapists, etc – rely upon their past experiences dealing with patients similar to the plaintiff to predict the impact that the plaintiffs’ injuries will have on his/her future ability to earn income. There are many reasons why the court should be reluctant to rely on this experiential evidence:

1. The plaintiff may not be representative of the patients that the medical expert normally treats: thus, the expert’s experience may not transfer easily to the plaintiff’s situation. For example, if the expert lives in a large city and the plaintiff comes from a rural area, the expert may not be familiar with the impact that a particular type of injury will have on the plaintiff’s ability to work on a farm. Or if the expert normally treats working-age patients, he/she may not be familiar with the impact of a particular type of disability on a senior or a minor.

2. If the medical expert has treated only a small number of individuals like the plaintiff, the sample size may be too small to draw statistically reliable inferences. For example, even a doctor who specialises in spinal cord injuries may have treated only a small number of quadriplegics. His/her experience with such a small number will provide only limited information concerning the plaintiff.

3. Even if the medical expert has treated a relatively large number of individuals like the plaintiff over his/her career, if the recommended treatment for those individuals has changed significantly recently, the expert may have treated only a small sample since that change. Again, the number of patients receiving the new treatment may not be sufficient to draw reliable inferences.

4. Often, the medical expert has been asked to comment on the impact that a disability has on employment, schooling, or earnings. As these are non-medical outcomes, the expert may not have systematically monitored them. Thus, the sample on which his/her information is based may be biased. For example, those patients who have adjusted well to their injuries, and who have returned to work, may be less likely to return to a doctor or psychologist for further treatment than those who have had difficulty adjusting. In this case, the doctor/psychologist may have developed an overly pessimistic view of the effects of the injury.

5. If the harm to the plaintiff is expected to continue for decades into the future and the medical expert has not been in practice long enough to have experience with patients whose treatment has continued for that length of time, the expert’s experience may not be reliable for predicting long-term consequences.

2. “Expert” Interpretation of Statistical Studies May Not be Reliable

When the expert attempts to supplement information drawn from his/her own experience with information drawn from studies conducted by third parties, a new set of problems arises. Specifically, the expert may lack sufficient knowledge or experience to be able to interpret statistical studies correctly:

1. The expert may have insufficient experience in the field to recognise deficiencies in the data. Many medical studies, for example, use a definition of “unemployment” that differs from that which is used by agencies such as Statistics Canada. The unsuspecting reader, who tried to compare the statistics drawn from the former with those drawn from the latter, could reach erroneous conclusions. Indeed, even within a reliable agency, such as Statistics Canada, similar-sounding names are often used to refer to quite different concepts. One must be careful, for example, to distinguish between “constant” and “current dollar” wages, between “net” and “gross” income, and between “real” and “nominal” interest rates. Failure to recognise these differences can lead to serious errors.

2. Because there is a lack of reliable data for predicting the effects of disability on labour market outcomes, experts are often forced to rely on data that were collected for other purposes. In many cases, this leads to the inappropriate use of such data. For example, doctors often use the American Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment” to calculate an index of the percentage of “whole body function” that has been lost due to an injury. Loss of an eye, for example, might be considered to reduce the patient’s “whole body” physical capacity by 25 percent.

Although the AMA did not design this index as a method of predicting the impact of disability on earnings, in the 1960’s and 1970’s it became common for experts to argue that a 25 percent reduction in whole body functioning implied a 25 percent reduction in earning capacity. Yet the connection between, say, loss of an eye or loss of a foot on the one hand, and loss of earnings capacity on the other is a tenuous one at best. Whereas loss of an eye could end the career of a professional athlete, for example, it might have very little impact on the career of an economist or lawyer.

Similarly, the rating system developed by Statistics Canada to categorise disabilities as mild, moderate, or severe yields statistics that are of very little value for predicting the effect of disability on the earnings of individuals within specific occupations. Yet many experts are currently using these statistics to make predictions of this nature.

3. The expert’s training in statistical analysis may be insufficient to allow him/her to distinguish reliable studies from unreliable ones. For example, studies that attempt to draw a connection between disabilities and labour market measures (such as income and employment) commonly rely on unsophisticated statistical techniques, making their conclusions very unreliable. Expert witnesses who are not well trained in statistical analysis may be unable to distinguish reliable studies from unreliable ones.

3. Published Studies May Not be Reliable

The most important problem facing the expert who wishes to predict the effect that disabilities will have on earning capacity is that many (if not most) of the statistical studies that have been published on this topic are unreliable. Some of the most important problems of which the courts should be aware include:

1. Many studies of the impact of disability on employment rely on very small samples. For example, it is not uncommon for articles on medical issues to study as few as 10 or 20 patients. Yet it is well known to statisticians that, in order to avoid the problem that “outliers” will bias statistical findings, it is usually necessary to have hundreds of observations.

2. Before the findings from a survey can reliably be projected to the population in general, it is crucial to ensure that the survey group is chosen in such a way as to be representative of the “population.” Many medical studies survey the patients from a single hospital or clinic, for example. But the findings of such a survey cannot reliably be projected to the general population if that hospital or clinic draws only from a sub-set of the population – for example, only from a relatively wealthy district or only from an urban population. And studies that attempt to contact patients many years after treatment may be biased in the sense that it may be easier to locate certain sub-sets of the group than others. For example, those paraplegics who have had the greatest success adjusting to their condition may be the ones who are most likely to have moved from the addresses they had at the time of admission to hospital and, therefore, may be the most difficult to reach at the time of the survey.

3. Although there are multiple factors that influence the effect of disability on employment and earnings, studies often collect information on only a small sample of these factors. For example, if older individuals are more likely to suffer from a particular disability (like arthritis) than are younger individuals, a data set that did not provide information about the ages of the individuals surveyed might appear to suggest that individuals with that disability earn higher average incomes than those who are not disabled (because individuals’ incomes tend to rise with age). Similarly, studies may overestimate the impact of a disability if more low-income than high-income individuals suffer from that disability.

4. Statistical studies can only show that variables – for example, disability and earnings – are correlated: they cannot show that one “causes” the other. That is, it is not clear whether disability causes low earnings, or whether occupations with low earnings have high accident rates. Labourers, for example, are more likely to experience on-the-job accidents than are office workers. If office workers earn more than labourers, data may appear to suggest that job-related accidents “cause” a significant reduction in earnings “because” those who have been injured earn less than the average person in the population. The more appropriate interpretation may have been that it was low income that had “caused” the accidents – that is, that it was the occupations with low earnings that had high accident rates.

One of the most common problems with medical studies is that they often do not report the age at which the disability became apparent. Yet we would expect that loss of a leg or an eye would affect individuals’ earnings differently if they were injured before they had completed their educations than if they were injured after they had established their careers.

What Can Counsel Do?

Medical experts often go unchallenged by the courts, even when they use unreliable statistical methods. How can the courts circumvent this problem, given that most lawyers and judges lack the expertise to question the bases of statistical testimony? I recommend three approaches:

1. If the opposing expert appears to be relying on his/her own experience as the basis for his/her predictions, at the “qualification” stage counsel should question the expert’s training in statistics. Do this not (necessarily) with the intention of convincing the court to reject his/her credentials, but to prepare the expert to agree with counsel that certain standards of data collection are important. Then use that agreement later to induce the expert to concede that his/her experience is inadequate for drawing reliable inferences.

2. Hire an expert in statistical analysis. Of those professions most commonly seen in court, actuaries and economists generally have the best training in advanced statistical techniques. Actuaries will have greater experience with life expectancy and fringe benefit data; while economists will have greater experience with data concerning education and incomes.

Other professions that also receive advanced statistical training are epidemiologists (often employed by medical schools) and statisticians (found in university departments of mathematics).

3. One option that is used occasionally in Canada, but less often than is justified, is to hire an expert in statistics to conduct original statistical analyses. As such an analysis is likely to cost at least $10,000-$20,000, it can not be justified for small, or “one-off” cases; but in a major injury case, in which the damages approach a million dollars, or with respect to the types of injury that counsel is likely to encounter many times, such an expenditure may well be justified. For example, my firm was hired by the defendants in one of the residential school sexual abuse cases. We used census data to estimate the earnings of individuals similar to the residents of those schools, but who had not been abused, and compared those earnings to the earnings of the plaintiffs. Similarly, in the second part of this paper (to be published in the next issue of the Expert Witness), I report the findings of a set of statistical analyses I conducted using Statistics Canada data, to determine the impact of various types of disabilities on educational attainment and income. These analyses could have been conducted by virtually any Ph.D.-trained economist in Canada.

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. He is also the author of Assessment of Personal Injury Damages (Butterworths, 2004).

Statement of Ethical Principles and Principles of Professional Practice – National Association of Forensic Economics

This article first appeared in the winter 2004 issue of the Expert Witness.

The National Association of Forensic Economics (NAFE, nafe.net) has members – including Economica – across the United States and internationally. It publishes the Journal of Forensic Economics which contains articles of interest to economists, accountants, finance and business professionals, vocational counselors, lawyers, and actuaries engaged in such fields as business valuation, commercial litigation, employment litigation, and personal injury and wrongful death torts.

NAFE also sponsors programs at regional and national economic conferences and has its own Winter and International meetings. Additionally, members communicate via an internet mailing list and quarterly newsletters.

As a condition of membership, members pledge to adhere to NAFE’s Statement of Ethical Principles and Principles of Professional Practice. We reproduce the statement below.

 


 

When providing expert opinion for use as evidence by the trier of fact, a NAFE member pledges, as a condition of membership, adherence to the following:

1. Engagement

Practitioners of forensic economics should decline involvement in any litigation when they are asked to assume invalid representations of fact or alter their methodologies without foundation or compelling analytical reason.

2. Compensation

Practitioners of forensic economics should not accept contingency fee arrangements, or fee amounts associated with the size of a court award or out-of-court settlement.

3. Diligence

Practitioners of forensic economics should employ generally accepted and/or theoretically sound economic methodologies based on reliable economic data. Practitioners of forensic economics should attempt to provide accurate, fair and reasonable expert opinions, recognizing that it is not the responsibility of the practitioner to verify the accuracy or completeness of the case-specific information that has been provided.

4. Disclosure

Practitioners of forensic economics should stand ready to provide sufficient detail to allow replication of all numerical calculations, with reasonable effort, by other competent forensic economics experts, and be prepared to provide sufficient disclosure of sources of information and assumptions underpinning their opinions to make them understandable to others.

5. Consistency

While it is recognized that practitioners of forensic economics may be given a different assignment when engaged on behalf of the plaintiff than when engaged on behalf of the defense, for any given assignment, the basic assumptions, sources, and methods should not change regardless of the party who engages the expert to perform the assignment. There should be no change in methodology for purposes of favoring any party’s claim. This requirement of consistency is not meant to preclude methodological changes as new knowledge evolves, nor is it meant to preclude performing requested calculations based upon a hypothetical – as long as its hypothetical nature is clearly disclosed in the expert’s report and testimony.

6. Knowledge

Practitioners of forensic economics should strive to maintain a current knowledge base of their discipline.

7. Discourse

Open, uninhibited discussion is a desired educational feature of academic and professional forensic economic conferences. Therefore, to preserve and protect the educational environment, practitioners of forensic economics will refrain from the citation of oral remarks made in an educational environment, without permission from the speaker.

8. Responsibility

Practitioners of forensic economics are encouraged to make known the existence of, and their adherence to, these principles to those retaining them to perform economic analyses and to other participants in litigation. In addition, it is appropriate for practitioners of forensic economics to offer criticisms of breaches of these principles.

Evidence About “Customary Practice”

by Christopher Bruce

This article was originally published in the Spring 2001 issue of the Expert Witness.

The standard of care that is expected of a commercial enterprise is often determined by examining the “customary practice” followed by businesses in the defendant’s industry. Obstetricians are compared with other obstetricians; taxi drivers with other taxi drivers; and police departments with other police departments.

The determination of what constitutes the customary practice in an industry is usually left to the testimony of experts drawn from that industry.

In a recent University of Chicago Law School working paper, William Meadow (Associate Professor of Pediatrics) and Cass Sunstein (Professor of Jurisprudence) warn that such expert testimony is likely to be systematically biased. (“Statistics, Not Experts,” John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 109, (2d Series) 2000.)

Their argument is not the traditional one – that experts will be reluctant to testify against their colleagues and, therefore, may understate the level of precautions “normally” taken. Rather, they argue that experts will systematically overstate the level of precautions that are normally taken, thereby raising the implicit standard against which defendants will be measured.

M & S base their argument on the oft-noted observation that “most normal people tend to be risk optimists, in the sense that they believe themselves to be relatively immune from risks that are faced by similarly situated others.” For example, they report that 90 percent of drivers believe themselves to be less likely than the average to be involved in a serious accident; and most heavy smokers believe they are not at increased risk of cancer or cardiovascular disease.

M & S report that physicians have been found to be particularly susceptible to this “optimism bias.” In one study, for example, 88 percent of doctors overestimated length of survival for seriously ill patients, by roughly a factor of three. In another, doctors made inaccurate predictions in 80 percent of cases, with overestimates in 63 percent. In a third study, physicians accurately predicted the survival time of cancer patients in only 10 to 30 percent of cases, and the rest of the time they overestimated survival by a factor of two to five.

M & S predict that this proclivity to optimism will affect doctors’ (and other experts’) ability to provide correct estimates of “customary practice.” In particular, they predict that this optimism will lead doctors to overestimate the ease with which they and their colleagues can recognise and treat symptoms and to underestimate the time required to react to medical emergencies.

To test this hypothesis, M & S asked a large number of emergency room physicians to estimate the average time that would elapse between the arrival of a child with bacterial meningitis in their emergency room to the start of antibiotic therapy for that child. They contrasted these estimates with statistics of actual times elapsed that they were able to obtain from their own study of two Chicago area medical centres and from two studies reported in the academic literature.

What they found was that the actual elapsed times were almost double the estimated times. Whereas the physicians’ average estimate was 65 minutes, the statistical studies revealed an actual average of 120 minutes.

Imagine now that a hospital has been sued in negligence for failing to treat a child within a “reasonable” time. If that hospital had treated the child within 110 minutes, it would actually have outperformed the average. But the average “expert” witness would have testified that most hospitals would have treated the child within 65 minutes. The behaviour of the defendant would be found to have fallen below the standard of “ordinary practice.”

(Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the defendant would be found negligent, as the court could conclude that the average hospital took less time to treat children than was required. However, this would be an unusual outcome.)

M & S further argue that this overestimation of the standard of ordinary practice will be common not only to physicians but also to experts within most other disciplines – from engineers to truck drivers – because they believe that most experts share doctors’ optimism. The result is that use of such experts will systematically bias the finding of negligence in favour of the plaintiff.

They conclude that:

  1. The courts should be very skeptical of testimony that attempts to identify ordinary practice based solely on the estimates of “expert practitioners.”
  2. Wherever possible, statistical evidence should be used in preference to practitioner evidence when determining ordinary practice.

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. He is also the author of Assessment of Personal Injury Damages (Butterworths, 2004).

Advice for Experts Facing Cross-Examination

by Steve Babitsky and James Mangraviti, Jr.

Steve Babitsky and James Mangraviti, Jr., of the Massachusetts consulting firm, SEAK, have written a book entitled, How To Excel During Depositions: Techniques For Experts That Work. They have graciously given us permission to reprint the following excerpt from that book. Although their tips are specifically concerned with answers to questions at depositions, most of their advice applies equally well to cross-examination.

This article was originally published in the summer 1999 issue of the Expert Witness.

Avoid Absolute Words

You are well advised to avoid, where possible, absolute words such as “always” and “never.” Absolute words are frequently an invitation to, and fertile grounds for, cross-examination by counsel. Counsel will attempt to damage your credibility by first getting you to make an absolute statement. She will then use counterexamples in an effort to show the falsity of your statement.

Don’t Elaborate or Volunteer

Volunteering information can be one of the biggest mistakes an expert makes at deposition. Generally, an expert should answer only the questions she is asked and not volunteer information. The volunteering of information will almost always result in new lines of cross-examination. It may also disclose information to which counsel otherwise never would have become privy.

Be Careful When Using Hedge Words

You need to be careful when using hedge words when expressing your opinion. Such words include “I guess,” “I believe,” “it seems,” “it’s possible,” and “I would say.” The only reason that you are testifying is to give an opinion. Hedge words and phrases can quickly undermine your opinion and are an invitation for additional cross-examination. Worse, counsel may be able to make a motion to have your entire testimony stricken because expert guessing is not allowed under the rules of evidence.

Example:

Q: That’s your “guess,” sir?

A: Well, what I meant to say, that it was my opinion that….

Lesson: The expert needed to avoid the hedge words. If he had an opinion he believed in, he should have stated it without employing the hedge words.

Concessions

In answering questions honestly, you may have to make an occasional concession. If you make the concession graciously and move on, you will exude confidence, integrity, and flexibility. If, on the other hand, you doggedly refuse to give an inch, you may come off as rigid and partisan.

The most common error the beginning expert makes in a deposition is the failure to concede an obvious and irrefutable point out of misguided loyalty to his or her side of the case…. Quibbling over the possible exceptions or equivocating in some way helps no one.

“I Don’t Know”

If you are asked a question that you do not know the answer to, your answer should be, “I don’t know.” There is absolutely nothing wrong with this response if you genuinely do not know the answer to the question. There are probably thousands of questions that can be asked of experts in any discipline to which they have no answer. The more the expert hesitates or tries to avoid saying, “I don’t know,” the more emphasis is given to this “lack of knowledge” by the jury or fact finder. No amount of hesitation will bring the answer to you if you do not know it.

Example:

Q: If those wrist rests were unavailable prior to 1991, would you agree she had a higher probability then of being in a neutral position?

A: I don’t know. That’s an interesting question. I don’t know. I mean I guess that’s my answer, I don’t know. But I think the wrist rests certainly emphasizes, even though you have the Ridyard’s ergonomic assessment of 1994, if Miss Sanford and/or her supervisor were trained, that would not have been a product of choice.

Lesson: If you allow yourself to get flustered, your lack of knowledge will be emphasized to the jury. The expert in this example would have been better served by replying, “I don’t know” and then sitting quietly and waiting for the next question.

“I Don’t Recall”

When asked about a fact, situation, or occurrence that you honestly do not remember, the best answer is, “I do not remember” or “I don’t recall.” This is only an appropriate answer when you honestly have no recollection. Perjury ramifications aside, an endless string of “I don’t recalls” (or even one that may seem hard to believe) may tend to damage your credibility. If your response is that you do not recall, counsel may then attempt to refresh your memory. This is permissible under the rules of evidence.

Beware of Open-ended Questions

You should be cautious when dealing with open-ended questions. These questions invite long, rambling answers. Counsel may be trying to get you to volunteer information not called for by the question. If you do volunteer information, it is likely that this information will be used against you during cross-examination. You should therefore answer open-ended questions as concisely as possible, being careful not to provide information that was not asked for. Experts are better served by brief, succinct replies to open-ended questions. If counsel has follow-up questions, let her ask them. Don’t do the lawyer’s job for her.

Avoid Slang

Avoid slang expressions when replying to questions. When they are transcribed and read back to a jury, these expressions diminish the value of your reply and can make you sound almost illiterate. Most slang expressions slip from experts unintentionally. To avoid making such a slip, you will need to maintain your concentration and focus.

Example:

Q: Now, sir, you were asked on direct examination about the history that you took from Ronald Evans, right?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: And the history is the story that he tells you, correct?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: Is that a yes?

A: Yes, it is

Q: Are you familiar with an organization called M.O.R. Incorporated, sir?

A: Nope.

Lesson: The expert’s use of slang cheapens his testimony and diminishes his credibility.

Counsel’s “Bumble and Fumble” Gambit

Do not help counsel when he is apparently bumbling or fumbling with some type of technical question. Experts are frequently tricked into volunteering key information by such real or feigned ignorance. Let counsel bumble or fumble all they want. Remember, you are there to answer questions, not to assist counsel in framing them correctly.

Yes or No Responses

If counsel asks for a yes or no response and you can answer the question with a yes or a no, endeavor to do so. If counsel attempts to insist on a yes or no answer to questions that cannot be answered in that fashion, you can state, “I cannot answer that question with a yes or no reply.” It will then be up to counsel to either let you explain your answer or rephrase his question.

What to Do When You Make a Mistake

Expert witnesses are not expected to be perfect. During a long and arduous deposition, you may misspeak or make a mistake or error. If you do make a mistake, you should correct the error on the record as soon as you recognize your error. “I want to correct a statement I made a few minutes ago. I stated that the 1991 EMG was related to the surgery. That is incorrect.” Counsel may quickly challenge you on your mistake before you have an opportunity to correct it. In that case, admit your error graciously. What you want to avoid after making a mistake is making the matter even worse by your inability or unwillingness to admit the mistake. This could make you look biased. If you discover your mistake after the deposition concludes, notify counsel and correct the deposition transcript when it comes for your signature.

“I Don’t Know, But…”

As an expert witness, you are under oath to tell the truth. You should not speculate, but should testify with a reasonable degree of certainty. At trial, many experts do not practice this principle and, in fact, speculate freely. One of the most common forms of speculation by experts at trial is the “I do not know, but…” reply. It is usually a mistake to use this response. First of all, if you don’t know, then any information you provide after the “but” is mere speculation. Secondly, you may volunteer damaging information after the “but.”

The simple, direct, and best response is, “I don’t know.” The throwaway statements that come after the “but” or “I don’t know” reply help counsel by providing him or her with additional information. This type of reply frequently results in new lines of inquiry and detailed questioning by counsel.

“Hoping”

Sophisticated counsel may attempt to trap the expert witness by the use of the word hope. If you inadvertently agree with a characterization, you may allow the lawyer to successfully call into question the reliability of your opinion. When you are confronted with an “And you are hoping…” question, it may be best to actively refute that characterization. Remember that when you are passive and agree to an attorney’s characterization or mischaracterization, you are in effect letting the attorney put words in your mouth.

Refusal to Speculate

You should not permit yourself to be tricked, cajoled, or forced into speculating when answering questions under oath. There is nothing wrong with the response, “I’m sorry, but I’m not going to speculate on that.”

“Possibility”

Beware of the use of the word possible. Testifying that something is merely “possible” is most likely legally insufficient. If your opinion is only a mere possibility, the judge will most likely not allow it to be presented to the jury as evidence.

“I Guess”

As an expert, you are testifying under oath. Your testimony will help resolve the rights and liabilities of parties who are involved in a legal dispute. Accordingly, there is no place for you to guess. Experts are well advised to leave the guessing to financial advisers, political pundits, and meteorologists. Your “guesses” are not admissible in evidence. Guessing can only hurt your credibility. It should be avoided.

“I Don’t Understand the Question”

You need not answer questions that you do not understand. If the question propounded to you is confusing, the preferred answer is, “I don’t understand the question.” Exercise caution in giving “I don’t understand” replies to avoid answering questions improperly. For example, if you are one of the leading computer experts in the world and have testified that you didn’t understand a question about a browser, it is likely that your credibility will be impaired. You must answer truthfully and are permitted to answer, “I don’t understand” only when that is the actual case.

Compound Questions

Frequently, attorneys attempt to confuse the expert at deposition by asking compound questions; that is, two questions combined. Sometimes the question is asked in a stream of consciousness manner that is difficult to comprehend, let alone answer accurately. When faced with such questions, appropriate responses include: “Counsel, you have asked several questions. Can you simplify the question so I can answer it accurately?” and, “Counsel, I’m sorry, I don’t understand the question. Could you please rephrase it?”

“I Assume”

You should not make unfounded or unsupported assumptions in an attempt to answer a question. If you can’t answer or don’t know the answer, say so. Expert witnesses need not and should not make unsupported or unsubstantiated assumptions in an attempt to answer questions at deposition.

Example:

Q: Does the computer program have the capability of printing out a master index of all of the crash tests?

A: I don’t know, but I would assume that some computer person set this system up and can go in and generate a list of all of the data in there….

Lesson: Assuming in a case like this is akin to guessing and should be avoided. A better answer might have been, “I don’t know.”

leaf

Steve Babitsky is President, and James Mangraviti, Jr. is vice-president, of SEAK Inc. SEAK is a provider of “inter-disciplinary seminars, distance learning resources, and publications” in the areas of workers compensation, occupational health and, medical-legal issues. Further information about them can be obtained from their excellent website: www.seak.com or telephone 508-548-7023.

The Role of Expert Evidence

by Christopher Bruce

This article was originally published in the summer 1999 issue of the Expert Witness.

The readers of this newsletter are familiar with the use of expert testimony in the Canadian court system. Nevertheless, most of us would be hard pressed to provide a clear definition of the difference between experts and lay witnesses. On a day-to-day basis, the best many of us could do would be to paraphrase the old saw, “an expert is what an expert does.” On occasion, however, it may behoove counsel to examine closely the witness being put forward by opposing counsel and ask “is that individual truly an expert?” In this article, I summarise some of the leading decisions concerning this question from both the Canadian and American courts.

The classic Canadian statement of the role of expert evidence is found in Kelliher (Village of) v. Smith, ([1931] S.C.R. 672), in which the Supreme Court of Canada, quoting from Bevan on Negligence, concluded that in order for testimony to be considered “expert”

[t]he subject matter of the inquiry must be such that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct judgment about it, if unassisted by persons with special knowledge. (p. 684)

Recently, in R. v. Mohan, ([1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, at 23) the Supreme Court elaborated on this requirement. There, Sopinka JJ stated that expert evidence must be both necessary in assisting the trier of fact and relevant. (Emphasis added)

Under the heading of “necessity in assisting the trier of fact” the Court made it clear that expert evidence was not to be admitted if the subject of the testimony concerned an issue which was within the common knowledge of the trier of fact. In particular, Sopinka JJ quoted approvingly from R. v. Turner, ([1975] Q.B. 834, at 841) in which Lawton, LJ concluded

An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. (R. v. Mohan, at 24)

Similarly:

…the evidence must be necessary to enable the trier of fact to appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature. (p. 23)

The Court ruled that, prima facie, expert evidence was “relevant” if it was “…so related to a fact in issue that it tends to establish it.” (p. 20) However, that was not to be the only criterion. In particular,

Evidence that is otherwise logically relevant may be excluded … if it involves an inordinate amount of time which is not commensurate with its value or if it is misleading in the sense that its effect on the trier of fact, particularly a jury, is out of proportion to its reliability. (p. 21)

Furthermore, relevance was also to include a test to determine whether the evidence was “reliable” and “essential.”

[E]xpert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory or technique is subjected to special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability and whether it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion without the assistance of the expert. (p. 25)

In short, the hallmarks of expert evidence were (a) that it concern matters of such a technical nature that the judge or jury could not be expected to reach a “correct” conclusion without assistance; and (b) that it be able to withstand close scrutiny to determine whether it was “reliable.” But those with some experience with litigation will recognise that this decision left many issues unresolved. Most importantly, a number of the terms that were crucial to the application of the Court’s decision were not defined. Without definitions of terms such as “special knowledge,” “reliability,” “novel scientific theory,” and “technical matters,” the lower courts were provided with little direction concerning the characteristics of “expert” testimony.

Some insight into the issues which can arise, and how the courts might resolve them, may be obtained by reviewing the interpretation which the courts in United States have given to Rule 702 of their Federal Rules of Evidence:

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

As the wording of this Rule reflects the wording chosen by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Mohan, the issues faced by the courts in both countries are similar.

Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court – Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ([1992] 509 U.S. 579) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, ([1999] 131 F.3d 1433) have ruled on the interpretation of the terms “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” contained in Rule 702. In Daubert the court set out four criteria for determining whether expert testimony met the requirement that it constitute “scientific knowledge.” These are:

  1. Whether the theory or technique “can be (and has been) tested.”
  2. Whether the “theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.”
  3. In the case of a particular technique, what “the known or potential rate of error” is or has been.
  4. Whether the evidence has gained widespread acceptance within the scientific community.

All of these criteria appear valuable for determining the admissibility of “scientific” evidence, such as the testimony of medical researchers. (The issue in dispute in Daubert was whether the drug Bendectin, when taken by pregnant women, had caused birth defects.)

These tests can also be applied to economic and psychological testimony, with some modifications. For example, the test of an economist’s or psychologist’s prediction that a particular child will graduate from university is not the usual “scientific” test, of waiting to see whether child does, in fact, graduate. Rather, it is a reference to the numerous statistical studies which have shown that a child’s ultimate educational attainment is significantly influenced by traits inherited from his or her parents and by such socio-economic factors as the child’s sex and his/her parents’ income and religion.

The second and fourth criteria are also applicable to testimony that is based on the use of theoretical constructs. For example, the concept of “opportunity cost,” which is the basis for one of the methods of valuing household services, has been developed by economists. Although it would be difficult to find direct empirical “tests” of this hypothesis, and its “potential rate of error” is not known; it has been “subjected to peer review and publication” and has “gained widespread acceptance within the scientific community.”

Similarly, whereas there is, to my knowledge, no published theoretical support for the use of the cross dependency approach to valuing fatal accident claims, a number of refereed articles provide such support for the use of the sole dependency approach. Again, although no “scientific evidence” can be offered that the latter approach is superior to the former, those who employ the latter can point to evidence of “peer review and publication.”

The Daubert criteria proved less applicable to issues involving “technical” knowledge, such as that often proffered by engineers, however. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear Kumho Tire. In that case, a number of passengers in the plaintiff’s vehicle were injured when a tire blew out. An expert in tire failure analysis relied in part on his own (extensive) experience to conclude that the blow out was caused by a defect and not by misuse on the part of the plaintiff. As the expert’s testimony did not meet any of the criteria set out in Daubert, the issue in Kumho was whether “technical and other specialized knowledge,” as defined in Rule 702, was to be subjected to the same criteria as was “scientific knowledge.” The Court ruled that it was not. Testimony about a technical matter could be considered to be “expert” if it

…. focuses upon specialized observations, the specialized translations of those observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the application of such a theory in a particular case.

The function of Rule 702 was not to restrict expert testimony to a narrow set of “scientific” disciplines, but to

… make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.

This requirement, that “intellectual rigor” be applied, offers one of the most important “gatekeepers” when evaluating the testimony of those who have been put forward as expert witnesses. Too often “experts” offer no justification at all for their choice of a particular approach; or they offer little more justification than that it has “always been done that way” or that “a number” of courts have employed that approach. This is not evidence of intellectual rigor; nor does it meet any of the criteria for reliability or relevance set out by the Canadian and American Supreme Courts.

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. He is also the author of Assessment of Personal Injury Damages (Butterworths, 2004).

On “Format of Expert Evidence of Economic Loss of Damages”

by Christopher Bruce

This article was originally published in the spring 1999 issue of the Expert Witness.

The Issue

Justice M. Bielby has invited comment concerning a proposed set of guidelines which deal with the presentation of expert evidence at trial. These guidelines, which were drafted by the Civil Practice & Procedure Committee of the Court of Queen’s Bench, attempt to ensure that the court receives enough information to permit it to calculate general damages in those cases in which it rejects the assumptions made by both sides to the dispute. The purpose of this article is to provide comment on these guidelines – which the Committee entitled “Format of Expert Evidence of Economic Loss of Damages” – from the point of view of an economist.

In a memorandum dated January 20, 1999, Justice Bielby offered the extreme example in which the plaintiff’s expert has been instructed to assume that the accident had left the plaintiff unable to work again; whereas the defendant’s expert has been instructed to assume that the plaintiff would not have worked even if the accident had not occurred. Thus, the plaintiff’s expert, in good faith, testifies that the plaintiff has lost, say, $800,000 of potential earnings; whereas the defendant’s expert, in equally good faith, testifies that the plaintiff has lost nothing.

This type of conflicting evidence does not create concerns for the court if there is a finding of fact that one or the other of these two extremes is correct. In that case, the court has sufficient evidence on which to base its calculation of damages.

When the court determines that the facts lie somewhere between the extremes offered by the two parties, however, the court may be left with little expert evidence on which to base its decision.

Assume, for example, that the plaintiff’s expert had been instructed that counsel would show that the plaintiff would have become an oil rig worker had the accident not occurred. The court, however, accepts the defendant’s argument that pre-existing disabilities would have prevented the plaintiff from entering such a physically demanding occupation; but rejects the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had been incapable of earning any income at all.

Now, the only evidence available to the court is that the plaintiff’s damages lie somewhere between $0 and $800,000. The court has little or no information concerning what occupation the plaintiff could have entered; and even if it had received such information, say from a vocational psychologist, it has no evidence concerning the income which could have been earned in that alternative occupation.

The Proposed Guidelines

The guidelines suggested by the Civil Practice & Procedure Committee are designed to avoid leaving the court in this awkward position. In summary, these guidelines are:

  1. The expert’s report must list each of the factors upon which findings of fact must be made; identify, for each such factor, the assumption which the expert has chosen to make concerning that factor; and provide the reasons for making each such assumption. (For example, if the expert suggests that it is important to determine what the plaintiff’s level of unemployment would have been, the expert must also report the assumption which has been made with respect to that level and must explain why that particular level has been chosen).
  2. In any rebuttal report, the expert must expressly identify all of the factors employed by the other expert with which he or she disagrees; and must provide reasons for that disagreement.
  3. If the testimony of the expert(s) is insufficient to allow the court to determine the set of damages, based on that court’s findings of fact, those findings may be remitted to any expert for calculation of the damages. (In such a case, all parties have the right to be heard concerning the accuracy of the expert’s calculations).

Commentary

The goal of the Procedure Committee appears to be to ensure that the court is provided with expert testimony which is sufficient to allow it to choose from any one of a number of possible combinations of findings of fact. If so, I believe that the proposed guidelines will not achieve their desired results.

The first proposal will not change experts’ testimonies for two reasons. First, it has been my experience, in well over 2,000 personal injury and fatal accident actions, that the actions “directed” by the first guideline are already followed by virtually all expert economists in Western Canada. Hence, the guideline simply directs experts to continue doing what they have been doing all along.

Second, even if an expert was to follow the first guideline, the Committee’s goal would not be achieved. In the example developed by the Committee, the differences between the experts did not arise from some disagreement between them concerning the “facts”. It arose from differences in the instructions which they were provided by counsel. For example, assume that one expert is told that plaintiff’s counsel will prove that the plaintiff would have worked on the oil rigs and the other is told that defendant’s counsel will prove that the plaintiff would not have worked at all. In that case, the first guideline proposed by the Committee will have no influence on the opinions and assumptions employed by either of them. Hence, the problem identified by the Committee will not be resolved.

Equally, the second guideline will simply result in the two experts reporting that they had been asked to employ mutually inconsistent assumptions. The experts, however, will be unable to resolve those inconsistencies. Hence, once again, the guidelines will offer them no incentive to provide evidence concerning “compromise” outcomes.

The third guideline encounters the drawback that it offers no incentive for the experts to modify their testimony in court. It is strictly a method for dealing with the problems contemplated by the Committee ex post. I think all would agree that it would be preferable to find some way of altering expert testimony at, or prior to trial. Not only would that simplify the court’s role in calculating damages, it would also increase the probability that cases would be settled before reaching the trial stage.

A Modest Proposal

It is my observation that most inconsistencies between economists arise from differences in the “facts” which have been presented to them. If this contention is accepted, then the solution is to find a method by which those differences can be resolved. I can think of two possibilities:

First, a pre-trial conference could be held to determine whether differences between the economists’ calculations were based on inconsistent understandings of the “facts”. If so, judicial mediation or a “mini trial” could be employed to resolve those inconsistencies.

Second, if it became apparent, at trial, that the parties disagreed concerning certain important facts, both economists could be asked to delay their testimony until the end of the trial. By that time, the testimony of the lay and medical witnesses will often have cast sufficient light on the unresolved factual issues that the economists will be able to make their calculations on the basis of largely similar assumptions.

Or, failing that, the court could, prior to the entering of the economists’ evidence, rule on the findings of fact. With perhaps a day or two delay, the economists could recalculate the losses bases on those findings and enter their calculations as “examinable” testimony, (rather than as written reports, as envisioned by the Committee).

Use of a “Multiplier”

An alternative approach would be to have the economists provide a sufficiently broad set of “multipliers” that most findings of fact could be accommodated within them. Multipliers arise in the following way: Assume that, for a given set of assumptions concerning the discount rate and the plaintiff’s starting salary, current age, rate of growth of earnings, and retirement age it is found that the present discounted value of his future earnings stream is $400,000. Assume also that the starting salary which has been assumed is $20,000. If all other assumptions could be held constant, it is readily seen that if the plaintiff’s starting salary was to increase by 50 percent, to $30,000, the present value of his lifetime earnings would also increase by 50 percent, to $600,000. Similarly, if the other assumptions were to remain unchanged, but his starting salary was to decrease by 25 percent, his lifetime earnings would also decrease by 25 percent.

An alternative method of representing this same set of facts would be to recognize that, in the case cited above, the present value of the plaintiff’s lifetime earnings was 20 times his salary. This figure is referred to as the “multiplier”. It is often provided to the court when the facts concerning rate of growth of earnings, discount rate, and age of retirement are not in dispute, but there is some disagreement concerning the plaintiff’s starting salary. If the court is told that the relevant multiplier is, say, 20, then, once the starting salary has been determined, the court can readily calculate the present value of the loss of earnings. For example, if the court in this case was to decide that the plaintiff’s starting salary would have been $25,000, it would be able to determine that the damages were $500,000 (= 20 x $25,000).

My suggestion is that the experts be asked to provide a different multiplier for each plausible set of assumptions concerning rates of growth of earnings, discount rate, and retirement age. Then, the only finding of fact which the court would have to make, before it could determine the appropriate level of damages, would be the plaintiff’s starting salary.

The determination of this set of multipliers will be less onerous than it may sound for two reasons. First, experts rarely differ significantly with respect to the discount rate or the plaintiff’s retirement age. Thus, multipliers would have to be provided only for a selection of growth rates of earnings.

Second, growth rates of earnings tend to be associated very closely to education level. A comprehensive set of multipliers can be provided simply by calculating a multiplier for each of four education levels: university, college or trade school, high school, and less than high school. In the table on page 13, I provide sample multipliers for each of these education levels, first for a 25 year old male and a second for a 45 year-old male. What is readily seen is that three such multipliers would generally be adequate to cover most possible scenarios for a 25 year-old: roughly 28.5 for non-high school graduates, 31.0 for high school and university graduates, and 37.0 for university graduates. Furthermore, because growth rates of earnings tend to approach zero for all groups in later years, one multiplier – approximately 12.5 – may be sufficient for most 45 year-olds. Only in unusual cases, such as those in which the plaintiff might have been able to obtain a post-graduate degree, would more than three multipliers be required.

Sample Multipliers

Table 1

This is not to say that provision of such a set of multipliers would resolve all of the problems contemplated by the Committee. Disputes may still occur with respect to the plaintiff’s starting salary, fringe benefit levels, labour force participation, retirement age, or unemployment rate; and disputes may also occur with respect to the discount rate.

Nevertheless, if a complete set of multipliers was provided, and if the courts were properly trained in the use of those multipliers, I believe that many of the Committee’s concerns could be mitigated.

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. He is also the author of Assessment of Personal Injury Damages (Butterworths, 2004).

Drawbacks to the Use of “Preliminary” Estimates

by Thomas R. Ireland

This article was originally published in the autumn 1998 issue of the Expert Witness.

In a recent posting to an e-mail service for economists who act as expert witnesses, Thomas Ireland, a well-known American economist, wrote about an issue that usually receives little attention — the dangers of relying on preliminary estimates. Although we do not agree with all of Dr. Ireland’s conclusions, we feel that many of the points he raises are of sufficient interest to be reported here. Accordingly, we reprint the following letter, with Dr. Ireland’s permission.

Fairly recently, I sent a letter to an attorney who had requested that I avoid producing any report except the final report of my opinions. This involved a situation in which I was asked to prepare preliminary estimates, but might not be asked to finalize my reports until several months later. It occurred to me that the text of this letter might be of interest to fellow practitioners.

Dear Attorney:

The purpose of this letter is to explain why I feel that I need to develop preliminary reports. I write my reports in the form of a letter addressed to an employing attorney unless asked to use a different format. In a very real sense, however, I write them to myself as well. This is for three reasons. First, in developing most reports, I must make a number of very small decisions that do not have a large impact on my damage assessments, but are things I need to remember at depositions and at trials. In my tables, is “age” shown as the plaintiff’s age at the start of the year, or on his birthday during the year? What issue of USFinancial Data was the source of my discount rate? How did I annualize the earnings figure in the year of injury? And so forth. If I am preparing a preliminary table, I need this kind of information if I pick up the file three months later and am trying to figure out exactly what I did to produce the exact numbers in my tables.

Second, my reports are not full of fluff that is designed to make it look like I did more work than I did (like many other economist reports that I see). They are simple narratives explaining what I was asked to do, what assumptions I was asked to make, what materials I was given to prepare, what I took from those materials, what additional assumptions I made, what my opinions are and how my tables work to produce those opinions. In effect, as I am writing the narrative parts of my report, I am subjecting my calculations to a step by step logical consideration of whether I have performed those steps correctly. I find mistakes much more easily when writing my narrative than by staring at tables or spreadsheets.

In other words, I need to develop a preliminary report to remember what I did and to check my calculations at the time I create them. Attorneys hate to see what they regard as unnecessary documents that might come back to haunt them. But the cost of not creating documents may be serious and much more embarrassing errors or failures of memory. For me to prepare extensive notes rather than narratives would take more of my time and be more likely to result in errors. Further, the notes themselves then become a document that could cause more trouble than a narrative. As I write my narratives, even in a preliminary report, every word is considered from the standpoint of whether I would want to be cross examined about the meaning of that word. I try to be very precise in my narratives, but am much less careful in notes I write to myself. I now typically type all of my handwritten notes as a part of deposition preparation to make sure that I have no handwritten notes that I do not understand.

Third, I want attorneys to read my narratives to see whether I may have misinterpreted any of the information they have provided to me. Sometimes important facts are given to me by telephone and I may have written them down incorrectly. Sometimes documents that I have been given create misleading impressions. I have found that attorneys are very good at picking up errors that relate to demographic facts in my reports. That is a very important part of the process of checking the validity of my analysis.

Perhaps a fourth reason is that right after I write a report, I see what I intended to write, but not necessarily what I did write. Several weeks later, I will see what I did write and be able to catch things that I could not have caught at the time I wrote a report.

The bottom line here is that if you ask me not to produce preliminary reports, you are asking me to take a greater chance of making an important mistake or being unable to explain how I arrived at one of the values in one of my tables.

leaf

Dr. Thomas Ireland is a professor of economics at the University of Missouri at St. Louis.

Doctors Are Not Experts on Life Expectancy

by David Strauss, PhD, FASA and Robert Shavelle, PhD

This article was originally published in the summer 1998 issue of the Expert Witness.

In personal injury cases, courts have traditionally relied on doctors for opinions on plaintiffs’ remaining life expectancy. We show here that such questions are really beyond the expertise of physicians, and that their testimony is readily challenged.

The analogy with life insurance is helpful. When applying for a life insurance policy you are first examined by a doctor, who assesses various risk factors. The results are transferred to the insurance company’s actuaries, who use the risk profile to assess your survival prospects. Thus both medical and statistical/actuarial skills are needed. Only a physician is qualified to appraise the individual, and only a statistician or actuary is qualified to turn the appraisal into a life expectancy.

Most physicians readily agree that they are not expert in actuarial issues. Nevertheless, pediatricians are still routinely asked to testify on the life expectancy of children with birth defects, while therapists or other medical specialists are consulted regarding adult accident victims. Their testimony on what are really statistical issues is often unfortunate. The following examples, with some modification, are drawn from actual cases.

“As a gerontologist I work with elderly persons. All the persons with cerebral palsy that I examine are at least fifty years old. Therefore I believe that this child with cerebral palsy will probably live to at least 50.”

We pass over this in silence.

“I believe that this child will certainly live to age 40, although probably not to age 50.”

It is, of course, absurd to say that any child – even one in perfect health – will “certainly” live to any age. Further, the probability that the age at death will fall in a narrow range such as 40-50 is bound to be quite low. The statement seems to confuse the life expectancy, which can often be estimated with some precision, and the actual age at death. The latter can rarely be predicted with any accuracy.

The annual mortality rate for children like the plaintiff is 1%. After 50 years, therefore 50% [ = 50 x 1%] of such children would have died. The median survival time is thus 50 additional years.”

There are two mistakes here. First, the math is wrong: in fact, 99% of the current survivors will survive one additional year, and therefore the proportion surviving 50 years is 61% (=.9950), not 50%. Second, the analysis ignores the dramatic increase in human mortality with age. As a result it gives wildly unrealistic long-term estimates, predicting, for example, that 37% of the population will survive to age 100.

* * *

Witnesses lacking statistical or actuarial training are frequently unable to define life expectancy, compute it in a simple case, or distinguish it from the median survival time. This may be exposed with a simple illustration.* If the witness cannot even explain what a life expectancy is, the testimony will lack credibility.

A physician’s opinion will be based either on a reading of the research literature or “on the basis of my clinical experience.” In the former approach, the plaintiff is matched to some group of individuals whose survival has been studied and reported. There are, for example, several studies of long-term survival for persons with cerebral palsy, traumatic brain injury, and spinal cord injury. Unfortunately such studies provide at best a crude estimate of life expectancy. The attorney can establish that:

  • The studies generally follow a cohort of persons who initially were of a given age and in a given condition. If the plaintiff is older and currently in this condition, it would be necessary to assume that cohort members surviving to the plaintiff’s age are still in that same condition. This assumption may be quite unreasonable, especially for young children who may have fair prospects for improvement.
  • Most studies provide survival curves, giving the fraction of persons in the cohort who survive to a given age. This will provide a median survival time only if the mortality is so high that 50% of the subjects die within the study period, and it rarely will permit the computation of a life expectancy.
  • The cohorts studied in literature are necessarily based on coarse classifications of one or two risk factors. Ironically, the clinician’s strength – the ability to make fine judgements about numerous patient characteristics – does not come into play.

It must therefore be recognized that published articles provide at best a rough approximation to a given plaintiff’s life expectancy. Indeed, some of the articles include a warning to this effect, a point that the opposing attorney may wish to emphasize.

Clinicians who instead rely on their experience for opinions are even more vulnerable. The lack of a solid basis can be revealed with questions such as:

  • How many patients closely resembling the plaintiff have you examined? [The answer will be at most a few dozen.]
  • Did you follow up on the survival or death of all of these patients? Give the specifics of your procedure. In particular, how did you follow the patients who moved to a different town or even to a different state? How did you ascertain who died? Where and in what form did you keep your records of the children’s survival time? Did you periodically reassess their functional levels during the follow up?
  • If you have been practicing for 20 years (say), how could you have ever observed a child surviving more than an additional 20 years? Does this lack affect your opinion? Why or why not?
  • Are you aware of the literature on statistical methods for estimating survival probabilities? Which methods did you use?

Such questions should make the limitations of the doctor’s expertise very clear.

Footnotes

* As an example, if 1/3 of members of a population will live exactly 2 more years, 1/3 will live exactly 3 more years, and 1/3 will live exactly 10 more years, then the life expectancy is (2 + 3 + 10)/3 = 5 years and the median is 3 years (the middle value). [Back to text]

References

1. Hutton JL, Cooke T, Pharoah POD. Life expectancy in children with cerebral palsy. British Medical Journal 1994; 309:431-435.

2. Chrichton JU, Mackinnon M, White CP. The life expectancy of persons with cerebral palsy. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 1995; 37:567-576.

3. Evans PM, Evans SJW, Alberman E. Cerebral palsy: Why we must plan for survival. Archives of Disease in Childhood 1990; 65:1329-1333.

4. Strauss DJ, Shavelle RM, Anderson TW. Life expectancy of children with cerebral palsy. Pediatric Neurology 1998; 18:143-149.

5. Strauss DJ, Shavelle RM. Life expectancy of adults with cerebral palsy. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology, in press.

6. Roberts, AH. Severe Accidental Head Injury. London: Macmillan, 1979.

7. Strauss DJ, Shavelle RM. Long-term survival of children and adolescents after traumatic brain injury. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, in press.

8. DeVivo MJ, Stover SL. Long-term survival and causes of death. In: SL Stover, JA DeLisa, GG Whiteneck (Eds.), Spinal Cord Injury, pp. 289-316. Gaithersburg MD: Aspen, 1995.

leaf

David Strauss, PhD, is a Fellow of the American Statistical Association and Professor of Statistics at the University of California, Riverside. He has frequently provided expert testimony on life expectancy in Britain, Canada, and the United States. He is director of the UC Riverside Life Expectancy Project, which specializes in the survival and life expectancy of persons with disabilities such as cerebral palsy and traumatic brain or spinal cord injuries.

Robert Shavelle, PhD, is a Visiting Professor at UC Riverside and a member of the Life Expectancy Project.

The Role of the Expert Witness in Developing “New” Law

by Christopher Bruce

This article was originally published in the spring 1998 issue of the Expert Witness.

One of the most exciting aspects of working in civil litigation is that participants in the legal system have the opportunity to influence the evolution of the law. Although some changes in tort law are imposed by legislatures, most developments are litigation-driven.

This raises a question which I have not seen asked anywhere else: Should arguments about changes in the direction of the common law be left to those trained in the law – judges and lawyers – or is there a role in this process for the testimony of “expert witnesses?”

I raise this issue as a result of my experiences with the evolution of two principles in damage assessment: the calculation of the dependancy rate in fatal accident actions and the calculation of the lost years deduction in serious personal injury claims.

Briefly, the two issues are these: In the case of the calculation of the dependancy rate, it is commonly accepted that the surviving spouse would have benefitted from approximately 70 percent of the (after-tax) incomes of each of the deceased and the survivor – with the remaining 30 percent having benefitted the deceased alone. What is not agreed, however, is whether the 30 percent of the survivor’s income which would previously have benefitted the deceased should now be deducted from the survivor’s loss of dependancy. (When this deduction is made, it is said that a “cross dependancy” approach has been used; whereas when the deduction is not made, it is said that a “sole dependancy” approach has been used.)

In the case of the calculation of the lost years deduction, the argument is that a plaintiff whose life expectancy has been shortened will not need to be compensated for the full value of the income lost during the years which he/she will not now live. Numerous theories have been put forward for the determination of the deduction which should be made – ranging from the deduction of only those components of income absolutely necessary to the maintenance of life to the deduction of the entire value of the plaintiff’s projected expenditure on consumption (i.e. deduction of the entire value of income except savings).

My purpose here is not to argue in favour of one or the other of the approaches to each of these issues. I have done that at length elsewhere*. Rather, my purpose is to ask what the role of economists – and other financial experts, such as accountants and actuaries – should be in the presentation of these issues to the court.

The Role of the Expert: Two Approaches

At least two contrasting approaches to the role of the expert can be defended. The first, which I will call “constructive” (but which others might call “interventionist”), recognises that legal arguments are often informed by developments in other disciplines – notably, philosophy, sociology, accounting, psychology, and economics. Where the arguments being made rely on sophisticated applications of these other disciplines, therefore, there may be a role for experts from those disciplines to testify concerning recent developments in the relevant literatures.

Some proponents of the constructive approach would go so far as to argue that such experts should be allowed to testify concerning what the law “should be.” A more appropriate role, I would argue, is that experts would merely be allowed to explain how the tools of their disciplines could be used to cast light on the issue facing the court.

The second approach, which I will call the “passive” approach, suggests that it is only those with formal training in the law who should be allowed to present arguments concerning potential changes in, or interpretations of, the common law. Hence, the opinions of non-legal experts should not be heard in court. The expert’s only role is to apply the existing law as best as he or she can.

The Constructive Approach

The primary advantage of the constructive approach, as I indicated above, is that theoretical and statistical developments in other disciplines will often be of value to the court in making its decisions. If extensive knowledge of these disciplines is required in order to fully understand the nature of the arguments, it may be preferable to have the presentation made in court by experts.

With respect to the lost years deduction, for example, economists, sociologists, and statisticians have considerable expertise with respect to both the definition and measurement of concepts such as “consumption” and “basic necessities.” And with respect to the measurement of dependancy rates, economists, sociologists, and psychologists have all written extensively about interpersonal relationships between spouses within marriage.

The primary danger associated with the constructive approach is that the expert will be tempted to stray beyond his or her area of expertise and begin to comment on matters requiring legal training. The first step in avoiding this problem is for the lawyer who has retained the expert to recognise that certain types of expert testimony can be construed as legal argument. Much of the testimony of experts in Canada concerning dependancy rates and lost years calculations, for example, has implicitly represented an argument concerning what the law “should be” – not because the expert saw that as his or her role but because the expert (and the retaining lawyers) had not recognised that that was what the expert’s testimony implied.

The Passive Approach

There are two advantages to the passive approach. First, it avoids the problem that the expert will stray outside the boundaries of his or her discipline. Second, if the law is well established, the expert will be able to avoid unnecessary testimony concerning possible alternative scenarios which have previously been ruled to be irrelevant. (For example, no Canadian economist would consider “wasting” the court’s time arguing that a tax gross up should be allowed on a loss of income claim, as the Supreme Court has clearly ruled that such a gross up will not be allowed.)

On the other hand, if the law is still evolving, the passive approach encounters two debilitating problems. First, any attempt to extract a straightforward rule from the decided cases is virtually doomed to failure. This is clear in the cases of both the dependancy and the lost years calculations. In both cases, there have been virtually as many different rulings as there have been judicial decisions. For anyone, lawyer or expert witness, to suggest that they can identify what “the” law is on either issue is presumptuous, if not preposterous. Nor would it be useful simply to adopt a “median” position. In issues like the dependancy rate there is no median position; and in issues like the lost years deduction there is no compelling reason to assume, ex ante, that the median position will prove to be the “correct” one.

Second, as a review of the decided cases on both dependancy rates and lost years deductions will reveal, when litigants first attempt to convince the courts to adopt a new legal principle, they often do not concern themselves with the finer details of those principles.

It is clear in the decided cases with respect to lost years, for example, that litigants and the courts have focussed primarily on the questions of whether such a deduction is required and, if so, whether it is “necessities” or the “costs of living” which should be deducted. Virtually no consideration has been given to the deeper issues of what the terms “necessities” and “costs of living” mean, nor of how one might measure those concepts. In the path-breaking Supreme Court case of Toneguzzo-Norvell v. Burnaby Hospital, the only evidence given by the plaintiff’s expert was as follows:

Q. …But would you agree that your average person … would spend something between 50 to 75 percent of their income on necessities…

A. Surely

No attempt was made to define the word “necessities” for the expert, nor was the expert asked to undertake any statistical research into the issue. Similarly, in another case which is widely quoted, the judge indicated that he had based his decision (concerning the lost years deduction) on the testimony of an expert economist. But when I contacted the economist in question he informed me that his entire testimony on that issue consisted of a brief response to a question put to him in cross-examination – a question to which he had not turned his mind prior to that time.

In the early stages of the development of new legal doctrines, it is common for “loose ends” to be left in this way. It would be inappropriate in my view for subsequent courts to rely too heavily on the “precedents” thereby established. Only when it can be shown that a superior court has turned its mind specifically to an issue, and ruled on it, would it be advisable for lower courts to rely on previously-made decisions in a developing area of law.

Furthermore, until the law has been clearly enunciated, it would seem inadvisable to insist that the expert rely strictly on “precedent” if that expert’s discipline has developed tools which would be of value to the court. Provided the expert testimony is presented as an aid to the court, rather than as an exposition of how the court “should” rule, that testimony may have a legitimate role to play.

Conclusion

It is not uncommon to find areas in the common law in which no clear precedent has yet been established. In some situations, like that of the argument concerning cross versus sole dependancy, this is because very few cases have been taken to court. In others, it is because the issues are so complex that the courts simply have not been able to turn their minds to all of the possible nuances. In these situations, I would argue that it would be irresponsible for an expert to argue that she or he had based a damage assessment on the “decided cases.”

At the same time, the expert must also recognise that his or her role in court is not to identify what the law “should be.” Rather, the expert must restrict her or his role to the presentation of theories or facts drawn from her/his disipline which can be expected to assist the court in making an equitable decision.

Footnotes

*On cross- versus sole-dependency, see Assessment of Personal Injury Damages, 2nd Edition (Butterworths, 1992); “Calculation of the Dependancy Rate in Fatal Accident ActionsExpert Witness, Winter 1996; and “Determination of Personal Consumption Expenditures in Fatal Accident Actions: A Note” Journal of Forensic Economics, 10[3], 1998.

On the lost years deduction, see “Shortened Life Expectancy: The ‘Lost Years’ Calculation“, Expert Witness, Spring 1996; “The ‘Lost Years’ DeductionThe Barrister, December 1996 issue (number 42); and “The ‘Lost Years’ Decuction” Lawyers Weekly, March 28,1997. [back to text of article]

leaf

Christopher Bruce is the President of Economica and a Professor of Economics at the University of Calgary. He is also the author of Assessment of Personal Injury Damages (Butterworths, 2004).

The Role of the Occupational Therapist in Personal Injury Litigation – Part 2

by Lorian Kennedy

This article first appeared in the winter 1997 issue of the Expert Witness.

In Part I the basic education and role of an occupational therapist and a basic assessment were discussed. This article outlines the specific value of an expert occupational therapist in a litigation setting and when costing future care needs. It explains how this role differs from other experts.

The occupational therapist understands medical conditions and can explain the impact of impairments in terms that are relevant to the individual case and day to day performance abilities. For example, how would loss of sensation in a hand impact employment if motor functions such as muscle strength and coordination have been preserved? A hairdresser, for example, would be able to use her hands only when she could see them directly. She would not be able to sense temperature, wetness, texture, bulk, etc. When her fingers were covered by her client’s hair she would not be able to tell where they were. She would not be able to feel inside a container to pull out hair clips, etc. Her speed and dexterity would be affected. She would be at higher risk of burning herself or her clients on curling irons. An established hairdresser might be able to compensate by focusing on other aspects of the hairdressing business such as administration. A starting hairdresser would be well advised to change careers to one with less emphasis on manual skills. For a typist this type of impairment would significantly reduce typing speed. In terms of housekeeping, more spills or errors and reduced efficiency would be expected.

Various methods of valuation of household services, such as opportunity costs or market replacement costs, have been discussed in past issues of this newsletter (The Expert Witness, Winter 1996). But these methods must rely on an estimate of what capacity the individual had prior to the injury and what loss has occurred. The plaintiff’s statements alone may not provide sufficient evidence to substantiate their claims. In Acheson v. Dory (1993) 8 Alta. L.R. (3d), at 128, Justice Picard cited factors to consider in loss of housekeeping awards: “specific tasks the plaintiff can and cannot do; the plaintiff’s pre-accident standards of housekeeping; modifications the plaintiff can make to achieve that standard; and the number of hours worked before the accident.” Later, in McLaren v. Schwalbe (1994) 16 Alta. L.R. (3d), at 108, she explained the importance of tendering evidence of “lifestyle, duties and responsibilities, standards, nature of the family unit, and perhaps the plaintiff’s goals.” These are the kind of issues addressed in an occupational therapy assessment. It includes detailed information specific to the individual and their impairments, the role they play in the family, the additional roles they may have caring for extended family, the adaptations they have already made, and additional adaptations or modifications that may be possible. This information is considered in the light of the individual’s performance on functional tests and takes into account pain, fatigue and emotional status. Following this assessment the occupational therapist provides an expert opinion on the number of hours of replacement services or other type of modifications or equipment that would be required to restore the plaintiff to their pre-injury status or as close to it as possible.

The sincerity of effort of the client is always a concern and many attempts have been made to quantify this, sometimes with simplistic methods, such as calculations of coefficients of variation of repetitive strength measures. In their study entitled, “Determining claimant effort & maximum voluntary effort testing: A discussion paper” (Work Function Unit, McMaster University, 1996), Strong and Westmorland, found that these methods, particularly those that rely mainly on physical testing, are founded on weak theoretical arguments and lack scientific reliability and validity. A combination of assessments using information from many domains such as medical reports, history, self report, functional testing, work site evaluation, etc. has been recommended rather than physical testing alone. The occupational therapy evaluation has the advantage of a lengthy period of time spent with the individual with a variety of test types and settings.

Distinguishing features of the occupational therapist

There is sometimes confusion about which experts are the most appropriate. There is no single answer as each case may require different expertise or in many cases a combination of experts.

At one time the physician was relied on to answer all questions regarding an individual’s ability to work. The physician is often still placed in this role and asked to comment on an individual’s work limitations or the match between the individual and their work. However physicians have rarely been educated in job analysis and usually have to base their opinions on brief office visits and medical tests rather than functional capacity testing. The Canadian Medical Association in a recent journal article, “CMA Policy Summary: The physician’s role in helping patents return to work after an illness or injury” (Canadian Medical Journal, 1997, 680) encourages physicians to refer their more complex patients for a comprehensive, objective assessment of functional capabilities, limitations and their relation to the demands of the patients’ jobs.

A vocational evaluator or counsellor usually does testing which relies heavily on pencil and paper test batteries and limited physical evaluation. These tests gather information on aptitudes and interests, and educational levels. This expert can provide market research and may assist with job placement. A computerized search can create a list of jobs which match an individual’s scores. However the lack of detailed information regarding physical capacity or psychosocial barriers can limit the value of the results. It is often an advantage to have an occupational therapist evaluate the individual first so that the vocational evaluator can incorporate the additional information into their analysis, ruling out jobs which are beyond the individual’s limits.

Similarly, standardized psychological tests include only minimal light physical demand components, but can provide detailed assessment of cognitive components. This type of assessment is particularly important where there is a possibility of brain injury or where depression may be a factor. On the other hand, the occupational therapist has the opportunity of being able to see the client perform in the “real” world and in some situations can try out various approaches in those settings.

Physical therapists have generally focused their attention on the physical components of assessment and on the various modalities of treatment. While measures of strength, range of movement, etc. are important they have limited usefulness to the court unless the impact on the individual’s ability to perform functional tasks or complex roles is made clear. Physical testing alone is not sufficient to answer the complex questions regarding a person’s ability to be productive or to pursue their goals.

Home economists have also played a role, particularly regarding loss of capacity to provide household services. Their input is valuable in terms of costing methodologies and comparisons of the individual to statistical data. However, occupational therapists are able to analyze task performance, to suggest modifications in light of medical conditions and/or impairments and to comment on functional capacity.

Other individuals such as nurses or people dealing with specific disability groups may also have developed expertise in costing, but have varying expertise in terms of evaluation.

Cases meriting referral to an occupational therapist

An occupational therapist’s background allows them to work with a wide range of clients, however individual therapists have often developed specialized areas of expertise. The OT expert will discuss a referral, at no charge, to determine if it would be appropriate to their expertise.

In the area of personal injury litigation the occupational therapist is usually involved once the individual’s recovery has reached a plateau. However occupational therapists can also provide a valuable role in case management, problem solving and treatment at earlier stages with improved outcomes and reduced delay before return to work or other resolution. Lack of funding for these services has been the major barrier to this role. Occupational therapists could also be of great assistance in cases of wrongful death to clarify the roles the individual played and to provide an opinion on the impact of their absence. To date they have rarely been used in this capacity.

If engaging occupational therapists, new to the role of personal injury litigation, lawyers must ensure that they understand the litigation environment. Assessments and reports that are performed for rehabilitation purposes tend to focus on assets and downplay impairments in keeping with a rehabilitation philosophy. However, in a litigation situation equal attention must be given to both assets and limitations. The future must be viewed based on what is likely and not necessarily what is hoped for. Adequate consideration must be given to the possibility of a less than optimal scenario.

Cost of the Evaluation

Each case must be considered individually and the assessment will vary depending on the complexity and the type of assessment necessary. A typical assessment of the type described below ranges from $1,600 to over $2,000.

Case Study

Mrs. X, 67 year old woman, was a pedestrian hit by a car two years previously. She fractured her left forearm and injured her right knee and back. The injury to her knee resolved but her arm healed with permanent angulation and loss of range of motion. Mrs. X complained of weakness, pain and loss of function in the left hand. Her pre-existing medical conditions included osteoarthritis of her knees and hips with surgery on her right knee with a good result. Right hip replacement surgery was planned in the near future to relieve pain from her osteoarthritic hip. No other treatment was planned.

A review of the background material and a detailed interview in her home revealed that Mrs. X was a homemaker at the time of her injury and lived with her husband. Prior to her injury she baby-sat her grandchildren approximately three hours a week. She knitted projects such as bedspreads. She had mobility difficulties related to her hip and her sleep was disturbed by hip pain.

Subsequent to her injury she was unable to set her hair in rollers, or cut her nails on one hand. She had difficulty bending and doing up her shoes. She had difficulty manipulating objects to do her usual cooking, or lifting, and she had relinquished most of the household chores because of a combination of hip pain and decreased hand function. She could no longer do any knitting or baby-sit her grandchildren. She was frustrated, angry and depressed with her pain and disability.

The laboratory assessment had to be adjusted for her age, hypertension and painful right hip. Evaluation of maximal lifting strength was not deemed appropriate. Comparison of left and right arms revealed limitations in speed, sensation and range of movement in her left shoulder, wrist and hand. Her ability to manipulate objects with her hands was observed in a variety of functional activities (such as picking up small items from the table, peeling potatoes, slicing, wringing out a cloth, and pouring from a pot). Evaluation of her ability to carry a ten pound bag (simulated groceries) revealed marked weakness on the left and pain. Grip and pinch strength testing also revealed marked weakness on the left. She indicated that she had no pain at the beginning of the testing session but pain in her left wrist when exerting force.

The occupational therapist was able to comment on Mrs. X’s functional limitations separating to some degree those impairments related to her hand from her other pre-existing complaints and noting their combined impact.

In the opinion of the occupational therapist Mrs. X was found to be consistent in her complaints and reports with marked impairment to her left hand function. No improvement in her hand impairment was anticipated but it was suggested that she could learn some helpful adaptive techniques. Some of her functional limitations were caused by her hip pain which contributed to her frustration and depression but a significant amount related to her left arm. She was less able to compensate for hip dysfunction by using her arms to work from a seated position. Her hip pain would hopefully be relieved by surgery but she would have to cope with ongoing loss of left hand function and pain. Decreased use of her left arm predisposed her to further loss of shoulder range and because of her lack of sensation in the left hand she was also at greater risk of injuring herself. Her ability to live alone in the future should she be faced with this eventuality was compromised.

Costs of future care were based on the combination of her hip and hand limitations. Costs included the following: adapted equipment ( specialized cutting board, non-slip matting to stabilize items while she manipulated them, a jar opener, grab bars, tub seat, hand shower); four hours of occupational therapy treatment at $75 per hour; weekly hairdressing services for hair care she used to do herself at $14 per week; bimonthly hair coloring at $35 minus the $6 for home purchased colouring; ten hours per week assistance with homemaking, food preparation and cleaning at $13 per hour; seasonal cleaning of eight hours at $16 per hour; five hours per week for five months per year for her share of gardening at $8 per hour; 0.5 hours per week for five months for her share of snow clearing at $8 per hour; and three hours of childcare per week for 48 weeks for five years at $8 per hour.

leaf

Lorian Kennedy has an M.Sc. degree from the University of Alberta, is a registered occupational therapist and the principal of Lorian Kennedy Consulting. She is an adjunct assistant professor in the Occupational Therapy Departments of the University of Alberta.

The Role of the Occupational Therapist in Personal Injury Litigation – Part 1

by Lorian Kennedy

This article first appeared in the autumn 1997 issue of the Expert Witness.

For more than a decade occupational therapists have been establishing their role in the field of personal injury litigation. The steady growth of that role as their contributions gain recognition is discussed by Irene Harris et al. in their article, “The occupational therapist as an expert analyst on the cost of future health care in legal cases” (Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 61(3), 1994, 136-148). In particular, changes in the law regarding compensation for loss of capacity to perform household services has led to increased demand for occupational therapists’ assessment skills to determine the impact of impairment on individuals’ abilities to perform unpaid labour such as housekeeping, child care or yard work and the cost of replacing this labour. Judges now require detailed information on functional abilities. Individuals such as entrepreneurs or farm wives, whose work is multi-dimensional, can benefit from the occupational therapist’s ability to analyze and describe their jobs and relate this to their past, present and potential function. It is a positive sign that occasionally both sides in a dispute will agree to share the cost of an occupational therapy assessment and analysis of costs of future care.

What is an occupational therapist?

Occupational therapists’ education includes knowledge of biological, behavioral, social and occupational sciences. This provides them with a unique perspective and set of skills that are particularly well suited to the questions to be answered in personal injury cases. The Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists notes in “Profile of occupational therapy practice in Canada” (Canadian Journal of Occupational Therapy, 63(2), 1996, 81) that “The impact of the disease process, physical and mental health as well as methods of adaptive functioning are underpinned by the acquisition and application of knowledge from such areas as occupational therapy theory and practice, anatomy, physiology, psychology, psychiatry, medical conditions, neuroanatomy, neuropsychology, human development, human occupation, pathology, sociology, economics, management, political science and ergonomics.” Alberta occupational therapists complete four years of university education, a minimum of 1,000 hours of supervised clinical training and a national certification examination before becoming eligible to enter basic practice. Occupational therapy is a regulated profession so practitioners must be registered with the provincial professional association. Considerable experience is usually advisable prior to practising in the area of personal injury litigation and some occupational therapists have postgraduate degrees with relevant specializations.

The “occupation” in occupational therapy refers to more than just paid employment. It encompasses everything that “occupies” a person’s time, in other words all the activities (including thinking) that are part of our engagement with living. Canadian occupational therapists use a model of practice that focuses on occupational performance. E. Townsend in Enabling occupation: An occupational therapy perspective (1994) refers to the ability “to choose, organize, and satisfactorily perform meaningful occupations that are culturally defined and age appropriate for looking after oneself, enjoying life, and contributing to the social and economic fabric of the community.” Physical and mental occupation is a fundamental human need and health depends on people having meaningful occupations. This perspective takes into account the dynamic relationship between persons, the social, cultural and physical environment and occupation. Also central to the practice of occupational therapy is the recognition that people are unique spiritual beings whose personal experience of meaning in everyday existence nurtures them through life events and choices.

The evaluation

At the time of referral the occupational therapist establishes the suitability of the referral with the referring lawyer. It is important to clarify what questions are to be answered. Both parties need to ensure that the evaluation process is mutually understood and that deadlines can be met. It must also be an appropriate time for evaluating the individual.

Once the referral is accepted the occupational therapist reviews relevant background material which usually includes the individual’s history, reports from physicians, psychologists, therapists, vocational evaluators, resumes, work history, school marks and portions of hospital records. In some cases the occupational therapist may request clearance from the individual’s physician before proceeding with physical components of the assessment. In cases where the individual has sustained severe or catastrophic impairments the physical component of assessment may be restricted to observing and evaluating the individual as they are cared for and interviewing the caregivers.

A detailed interview and completion of questionnaires provide information on medical, work, education, leisure and psychosocial aspects of the individual’s situation. The interview is usually conducted in the home. This helps to put the individual at ease and provides additional information on lifestyle, family and leisure interests, housekeeping roles, and cultural and social contexts. The individual’s perceptions of their abilities and information on their attempts to adapt to reduced function or to pain are an important part of the evaluation. This self-report provides a context for planning further evaluation. The occupational therapist looks for consistency and compatibility between the diagnosis, reported activities and performance during the next stage of the assessment.

Standardized testing and functional performance assessment (functional capacity evaluation) is usually performed in a clinical setting. Objective testing and skilled observation are used to measure factors such as work aptitudes, strength, flexibility, motor skills, perception, activity tolerance, ability to remember and follow directions, and work behaviors. Ability to stand, walk, sit, kneel, squat, reach, lift, and manual dexterity, or other factors specific to the individual situation are measured. In some cases the occupational therapist performs a work site job analysis or sets up simulated work. The occupational therapist may obtain consent to interview other family members, work associates, or teachers particularly in cases of brain injury where individuals may lack the ability to evaluate their own occupational performance.

There are numerous names for functional capacity evaluations and many variations on techniques. Some approaches use “high tech” equipment and computer generated reports. Despite manufacturer’s claims there is little evidence that these machines meet requirements for reliability and validity or that they are any better than simpler methods. Focusing too much on strictly physical components can blind the assessor to important psychosocial, environmental and other factors that are critical for the individual.

The report

The assessment results are summarized in a clear report which describes the individual’s functional abilities as they relate to self-care, leisure and productivity (including paid and unpaid work), nature of impairment and the impact on their capacity to carry out specific life tasks. The report also comments on the impacts on other family members. Where appropriate, the occupational therapist makes recommendations regarding training, treatment, modified or adapted work, ergonomic alterations, housing or care needs, assistive devices, equipment or techniques. The occupational therapist can also prepare a cost of future care report detailing the need for equipment, medical services, support services, adapted housing, transportation, clothing, education or other needs and their associated costs.

Next issue

In the next issue of The Expert Witness, Part II of this article will discuss the specific relevance of the occupational therapist’s expertise in a litigation setting and compare it to the role of other experts. A case study will provide an example.

leaf

Lorian Kennedy has an M.Sc. degree from the University of Alberta, is a registered occupational therapist and the principal of Lorian Kennedy Consulting. She is an adjunct assistant professor in the Occupational Therapy Departments of the University of Alberta.